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of multilayered conduct, but their holdings do not rest on that line of
reasoning. The McHan holding, on the other hand, rests squarely on a
decision that courts should not apply the Brown analysis in prosecutions
for multilayered criminal conduct. Circuit court cases such as McHan may
force the Supreme Court to reexamine the Felix and Garrett dicta con-
cerning double jeopardy protections in CCE and similar prosecutions.
Until that time, the constitutionality of the McHan decision remains
unclear.
I. FEDERAL CIV PROCEDURE
Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross
974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992)
Acquired Immune Deficiency System (AIDS) is a significant health
problem in the United States today.4 8 One of the many consequences of
the AIDS problem has been concern over the nation's blood supply. While
AIDS is primarily transmitted through sexual contact and shared drug
needles, it can also be transmitted through blood transfusions, blood
components such as plasma, and tissue transplants. 409 The possibility of
acquiring the disease through these latter means has spawned several
lawsuits in which a blood recipient has sued the blood provider to collect
for damages resulting from the use of tainted blood for their transfusion.
410
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), parties can
generally obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to the pending action or information that is reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of such admissible evidence. 41' The discovery
allowed, however, is limited. The FRCP allows the district court to issue
protective orders upon the motion of a party or upon the motion of a
person from whom discovery material is sought. 41 2 Such an order may be
408. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SuRvEmnANcE REPORT 9 (Dec. 1990)
(revealing existence of 157,525 AIDS cases reported in United States through November 1990).
409. See Peter B. Kunin, Note, Transfusion-Related AIDS Litigation: Permitting Limited
Discovery From Blood Donors in Single Donor Cases, 76 CoRNMu L. REV. 927, 928 n.4 (1991)
(discussing and categorizing most recent cases on blood transfusion litigation).
410. See generally Borzillieri v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 139 F.R.D. 284 (W.D.N.Y.
1991) (involving litigation between executrix of decedent and blood suppliers, allowing limited
discovery allowed); Bradway v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 132 F.R.D. 78 (N.D. Ga. 1990)
(same); Coleman v. American Red Cross, 130 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (involving litigation
by infected individual and her husband against blood supplier, denying discovery); Boutte v.
Blood Sys., Inc., 127 F.R.D. 122 (W.D. La. 1989) (involving litigation between recipient of
tainted blood and blood suppliers, allowing discovery); Doe v. American Red Cross Blood Servs.,
125 F.R.D. 646 (D.S.C. 1989) (same, denying discovery); Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121
F.R.D. 300 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (same, allowing limited discovery); Kunin, supra note 398, at 927
n.2 (compiling scholarly materials on transfusion-related issues).
411. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
412. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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made by the district court if justice requires it to be made to protect a
person or a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue
burden or expense. 413 Eight different options are available to the judge in
seeking to avoid the above concerns, 414 and in making these decisions, the
district court is afforded wide discretion.
411
The application of these well-established discovery rules to recent AIDS
related litigation is the setting in which the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit decided Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross.416 The
Watson court addressed the question of whether direct discovery from an
anonymous volunteer blood donor should be prohibited under the FRCP
or the United States or South Carolina Constitutions.
4 17
The plaintiff in Watson, Cynthia Watson, gave birth to premature
twins in 1985. One of the twins required numerous blood transfusions.
This blood was contaminated by human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).
The infected child tested positive for HIV in 1986 and died in 1988.418
Watson brought suit as administratrix of the dead child's estate against
Lowcountry Red Cross (Lowcountry) and the hospital where her son was
born. Watson alleged, inter alia, that the screening process used by
Lowc6untry was inadequately and negligently carried out by Lowcountry
employees present at the donor station.
419
Of the six donors whose blood was used, Lowcountry identified one
of them as the only person who could have been infected at the time that
person gave the blood. Lowcountry supplied Watson with a redacted copy
of the screening questionnaire-required of all blood donors-completed
by the donor suspected of carrying AIDS when he gave the blood. 420 Two
nurses on duty on the date of the donation were also deposed, but they
were unable to recall the specific donor in question. Not satisfied with the
outcome of this discovery, Watson persisted in attempting to discover
information from the implicated donor about his background and the
donation process.
Lowcountry moved for a protective order, which was partially granted
by the magistrate judge. The magistrate allowed some discovery from the
413. Id.
414. See id. (listing as options preventing discovery: limit discovery to certain specified
terms; imposing a specific mechanism by which discovery must be taken; scope or subject matter
of inquiry limited; exclusion of certain persons while discovery being conducted; sealing depositions
and allowing opening only on order of court; preventing disclosure of trade secrets or confidential
research and development; and simultaneous filing of specified documents or information in
sealed envelopes to be opened by court only).
415. See Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, 758 F.2d 1486, 1505 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing
district court "wide discretion" in determining scope and effect of discovery), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1107 (1986).
416. 974 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1992).
417. Watson v. Lowcountry Red Cross, 974 F.2d 482, 484-85 (4th Cir. 1992). For another
summary of Watson, see 61 U.S.L.W. 2151 (Sept. 22, 1992).
418. Watson, 974 F.2d at 483.
419. Id. at 484.
420. Id. The Fourth Circuit uses masculine pronouns in its opinion. Id.
19931
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 50:243
implicated donor but fashioned various mechanisms to ensure that his
identity would not be divulged. 42' Upon Lowcountry's objection, the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina heard
argument and affirmed the Magistrate's report.422 The district court granted
Lowcountry's request for an interlocutory appeal, 423 and the appeals court
granted leave to file the appeal.
On these facts, the Fourth Circuit held in favor of the plaintiff.
Lowcountry based its position on two main arguments. First, allowing
Watson to discover the donor information in this case would endanger
the adequacy of the nation's blood supply. They argued that if plaintiffs
such as Watson are allowed to involve donors in tort actions, fewer people
will donate blood. Obviously, fewer donors means less available blood.
The Fourth Circuit panel rejected this argument. Rather than attempt-
ing to balance the competing interests of the nation against those of the
plaintiff for discovery in the instant action, the court affirmed the district
court's approach. The district court ruled that Lowcountry failed to present
"hard statistical data" to support the position that discovery would cause
a decrease in available blood supplies. 424 To the extent that the district
court made a factual determination, the clearly erroneous standard of
review applies. The Fourth Circuit did not find the decision clearly
erroneous.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected Lowcountry's claim that donors would
lie in order to give blood. The motive to lie arises from a donor's desire
to give blood. The false information would undermine the effectiveness
of the present screening process. The Fourth Circuit found this fear
illogical because altruistic blood donors would probably not lie in order
to have needles in their arms for an hour and because lying would not
remove an individual from the litigation process. Hence, the motive to lie
is illusory at best.
The next argument advanced by Lowcountry was that the donor's
privacy rights would be violated if the information sought by Watson was
released. After declaring, without analysis, that Lowcountry had standing
to raise the donor's constitutional rights, the court discussed the nature
of the right for which protection was sought. Two components existed.
421. Id. The magistrate proposed that the donor's identity be revealed to the court and that
a lawyer be appointed, the costs of whom were to be borne by the plaintiff, to represent the
donor's interests. The lawyer so appointed was to remain confidential also. Watson, in turn,
would be allowed to file written interrogatories to which the Red Cross could object. These
questions would then be forwarded to the donor via his appointed attorney. Id. The interrogatories
that were finally approved are appended to the appellate decision. Id. at 490-91.
422. Watson v. Medical Univ., No. 9:88-2844-18, 1991 WL 406979 (D.S.C. Feb. 7, 1991).
423. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) (describing interlocutory appeal procedure and require-
ments).
424. Watson, 974 F.2d at 485. The appeals court also rejected the opinion testimony of the
defendant's expert witness. Id. at 486. That testimony was essentially the expert making the same
argument as the Red Cross's attorneys did. Id. It did not contain the statistical data the district
court found lacking and was counter balanced by the expert testimony of the plaintiff. Id.
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First, the donor might be exposed to grievous harm if his identity were
disclosed. The court labelled this argument a "red herring" and rejected
it. The court cited Whalen v. Roe 25 for the proposition that the risk of
public disclosure of a person's identity was an insufficient basis on which
to find a violation of privacy rights.426 The court further explained that
the safeguards imposed by the magistrate judge made the possibility of
disclosure remote.
4 2 7
The second component of the asserted constitutional right was the
potential that the questions asked would tend to harass and embarrass the
donor. The Fourth Circuit held for Watson on this point as well. Because
donors must fill out prescreening questionnaires before giving blood, they
are already subject to the possibility of embarrassment and harassment,
provided that proper procedures are followed. Furthermore, if a consti-
tutional right does exist, it flows from the embarrassment that occurs
from the public disclosure of the donor's identity.428 According to the
Watson court, embarrassment or harassment flowing from answering
questions does not implicate a protectable privacy interest. The court
exaplained that any remaining privacy interest is greatly outweighed by
the interest of plaintiffs such as Watson in procuring discovery and the
public's interest in assuring compensation for plaintiff's injuries.
Judge Widener concurred arguing that Lowcountry lacked standing to
assert the donor's constitutional rights. To the extent the constitutional
question was considered, however, the concurrence dismissed the existence
of any privacy right that would allow a donor or seller of blood to
withhold information concerning that person's knowledge of their disease.
Judge Russell dissented, arguing three essential points. First, several
other decisions have recognized that a threat to the nation's blood supply
does exist and "hard statistical evidence" is not necessary to confirm this
fact. Second, the dissent disagreed with the notion that the protective
order goes far enough in the protection of the donor's identity. The dissent
pointed out that the communication between the attorney, the court, and
the donor will not go unnoticed by those around the donor. This attention
threatens further exposure of- the donor's personal medical information.
Finally, Judge Russell argued, Watson's discovery interests do not out-
weigh society's interest in a safe and adequate blood supply. The "incre-
425. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
426. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600-01 (1977).
427. See supra note 410 (describing safeguards set forth in protective order). The Watson
court specifically noted the special precautions taken to ensure the that donor's identity was
protected. These included the court's order that Lowcountry reveal the name, which it already
knows, only to the court and to the lawyer appointed by the court; that the revelation was to
be made via hand-delivered letter directly to the judge's chambers; and that any answers of the
donor would be maintained in a sealed envelope marked "Confidential." Watson, 974 F.2d at
487-88.
428. See supra notes 414-15 and accompanying text (rejecting theory of constitutionally
protected right to privacy based upon potential risk of public disclosure).
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mental information Watson might discover from deposing the donor" is
not worth the risks to the blood supply or the constitutional right of
privacy of the donor.
429
No other circuit has addressed this issue. Three considerations may
explain this fact. First, given that the scope of discovery is within the trial
court's discretion, the chance of overturning that court's course of action
is limited at best. Thus, little incentive exists to appeal an adverse decision.
Second, the issue of revealing a blood donor's identity, while generating
a lot of commentary, is still relatively new. The first reported district
court opinion regarding discovery of AIDS information from an anony-
mous donor occurred in 1988.430 The first reported state supreme court
decision regarding the same issue occurred in 1987.431 Third, the underlying
cause of action is grounded in tort, thus, absent diversity jurisdiction,
these cases are not presented to the federal courts. The combination of
these three factors and the unique factual requirements necessary to present
the issue makes it apparent why the issue has not arisen in another federal
circuit.
The Fourth Circuit decision does, however, contrast with the approach
taken by some state supreme courts in construing provisions that are the
same or very similar to the FRCP provision. 4 2 The differences between
the majority and the dissent in Watson are representative of the essential
differences between the cases allowing discovery and those disallowing
discovery. The debate focuses on the emphasis that should be put on the
various interests identified and how, or whether, those interests should be
balanced.433
429. Watson, 974 F.2d 493 (Russell, J., dissenting).
430. Mason v. Regional Medical Ctr., 121 F.R.D. 300 (W.D. Ky. 1988).
431. Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
432. See also Kunin, supra note 398, at 934-42 (analyzing cases); Karen L. Elimore,
Annotation, Discovery of Identity of Blood Donor, 56 A.L.R.4T 755 (1987) (discussing Ras-
mussen and compiling other cases). Compare Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Serv., 500 So. 2d
533 (Fla. 1987) (denying discovery); Laburre v. East Jefferson Gen. Hosp., 555 So. 2d 1381 (La.
1990) (same) with Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Ctr. v. District Court, 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo.
1988) (allowing discovery); Most v. Tulane Medical Ctr., 576 So. 2d 1387 (La. 1991) (same);
Snyder v. Mekhjian, 593 A.2d 318 (N.J. 1991) (same); Stenger v. Lehigh Valley Hosp. Ctr., 609
A.2d 796 (Pa. 1992) (same); Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Ctr., 819 P.2d 370 (Wash. 1991) (same).
Kunin divides the cases into two categories: "multiple donor" cases where the plaintiff seeks
discovery of the identity of numerous donors in an attempt to prove that their blood caused the
plaintiff's contraction of AIDS and "single donor" cases where the fact of AIDS is admitted
and the issue is instead whether the screening procedures used by the blood collector where
adequate. Kunin, supra note 398, at 928-29.
433. See Watson, 974 F.2d at 486 (refusing to balance interest of plaintiff against interest
of nation in adequate blood supply). A third argument has also been raised in these cases. Some
blood suppliers attempt to argue that the physician-patient privilege extends, or should extend,
to the information sought. Kunin, supra note 398, at 946-48. Because the nature of the patient-
physician privilege varies according to statute in each state, a comprehensive analysis is outside
the scope of this comment. Id. at 946. The argument has met with varying success. Compare
Stenger, 609 A.2d at 803 (rejecting patient-physician privilege argument) with Krygier v. Airweld,
Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 475, 476-77 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (accepting rationale behind patient-physician
privilege in blood donor context).
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The most important factor of Watson, as opposed to the other
significant cases addressing the issue, is the Watson court's unwillingness
to consider balancing the policy interests, as opposed to the constitutional
interests, involved. It is significant that the appellate court sustained the
district court on the basis of the latter's factual findings and not its legal
judgment in balancing the competing interests. This is a favorable devel-
opment for at least two reasons. First, unsubstantiated assertions of a
national interest should be rejected. Given society's interest in adequate
compensation for those who are injured by other's negligence, 43 4 a plain-
tiff's right to recovery should only be restricted upon clear proof of
damage to nationwide interests. The use of the clearly erroneous standard
in reviewing district court findings will provide litigants the necessary
incentive to advance, by clearly defined argument supported by specific
facts, the required proof.
Second, the balancing which Lowcountry sought in this case is inher-
ently biased. By setting the interest of society against the individual, courts
inevitably start with a utilitarian assumption in favor of denying discovery.
Plaintiffs face an uphill battle just to get recognition of their interests on
a par with those of society. The Fourth Circuit, by not even reaching the
balancing stage, has enabled plaintiffs to compete more equitably with
defendants on this discovery issue.
Erie Insurance Exchange v. Stark
962 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1992)
Generally, insurance companies are not liable for losses that the insured
intentionally inflicts.43s However, insurance policies usually cover destruc-
tion of insured items caused by mere fault or negligence. 4 6 Insurers can
sometimes avoid liability in such situations by including policy provisions
excluding coverage if specific criteria are met. For example, courts com-
monly have upheld policy clauses excluding coverage for fires created by
a hazard within the control or knowledge of the insured. 4 7 Another
434. See Rasmussen, 500 So. 2d at 538 (recognizing plaintiff's interest in full recovery for
injuries).
435. See, e.g., Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139, 153-54 (1898) (holding life
insurance company is not liable when insured directly and intentionally took own life while of
sound mind); Sullivan v. American Motorist Ins. Co., 605 F.2d 169, 170 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding
willful incendiarism is defense to liability of insurer even if policy does not specifically exclude
coverage for willful purpose); Don Burton, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 575 F.2d 702,
706-07 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding defense of arson excludes coverage if insured aided, abetted, or
procured setting of fire).
436. See Waters v. Merchants' Louisville Ins. Co., 36 U.S. 213, 221 (1837) (holding policy
insuring against fire covered loss caused by insured's negligence).
437. See Charles Stores, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 490 F.2d 64, 69 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding
that insured must have control and knowledge of incendiary device for increase in hazard
provision to apply); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilson-Keith & Co., 247 F.2d 249, 259
(8th Cir. 1957) (holding that increase in hazard must be both within insured's control and
knowledge for coverage to be excluded under increase in hazard policy provision).
19931
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common insurance provision voids coverage if the insured party neglects
to use all reasonable means to save property after a fire has begun.
4
1
In Erie Insurance Exchange v. Stark,43 9 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a homeowner's policy
covered a loss caused by the insured's setting fire to his home in an alleged
attempt to commit suicide by self-immolation. Ray Stark was suffering
from severe depression caused by his son's recent death in an automobile
accident. On July 25, 1988, he returned to his home in Lonaconing,
Maryland after consuming a large amount of alcohol. He was very violent,
and his wife called the police. Ray fled before the police arrived. The
police told his wife and their daughter to leave the house. Stark returned
later that evening, and the house caught on fire. Firefighters found him
lying 100 yards from the house suffering from second and third degree
burns on his legs and feet. Based on conversations with Stark, Dr.
Veluppillai Nagulendran, Stark's treating physician, postulated that Stark
set fire to the house while attempting to commit suicide by spreading
gasoline on himself and igniting it. Thereafter, Stark's wife filed an
insurance claim with Erie Insurance Exchange (Erie) pursuant to a hom-
eowner's insurance policy. The company denied coverage. Not being able
to settle the dispute amicably, Erie filed an action for declaration of
noncoverage in the United States District Court for the District of Mar-
yland. Erie claimed that Stark's act of setting fire to the premises voided
Erie's liability pursuant to increase in hazard, neglect, and intentional loss
provisions in the insurance policy. The Starks counterclaimed for breach
of contract, conversion, and tortious interference with prospective advan-
tage.
The district court dismissed the Starks' counterclaims, but ruled in
favor of the Starks on cross-motions for summary judgment on Erie's
noncoverage claim. The district court reasoned that each of Erie's policy
provisions required a particular state of mind that Stark was incapable of
possessing due to insanity. The court apparently accepted Dr. Nagulen-
dran's testimony regarding Stark's purpose and mental state as conclusively
establishing Stark's state of mind before the fire. Dr. Nagulendran believed
Ray was able to form the intent to commit suicide, but was suffering
from a mental disorder such that he could not distinguish right from
wrong and could not conform his behavior to the requirements of the
law. Due to Erie's failure to present its own expert opinion on this subject,
438. See Beavers v. Security Mut. Ins. Co., 90 S.W. 13, 14 (Ark. 1905) (holding that fire
insurance policy clause excluding coverage for losses caused by neglect of insurer to save property
prevented recovery for damage of so much of property as could have been averted had insured
exercised due care); First Nat'l Bank v. German Am. Ins. Co., 134 N.W. 873, 876-77 (N.D.
1912) (holding that insured cannot recover under fire insurance policy when evidence indicates
insured did not exercise proper diligence to save property and policy excluded coverage for losses
caused by insured's neglect to use all reasonable means to save and preserve property).
439. 962 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1992).
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the court found no genuine issue of material fact as to Stark's intent and
mental state at the time of the fire.
Erie appealed from the judgment on policy coverage, and the Starks
cross-appealed the district court's dismissal of their conversion and tortious
interference claims. The Fourth Circuit found that two genuine issues of
material fact precluded the district court from deciding the issue of Erie's
liability as a matter of law on summary judgment. First, the appeals court
found Ray Stark's purpose in starting the fire was disputable. Secondly,
the Fourth Circuit held that even assuming Stark possessed a suicidal
purpose, the district court must determine whether the specific character-
istics of Stark's insanity would negate application of any of Erie's non-
coverage provisions.
As to the first issue, the Fourth Circuit stated that the lower court
incorrectly accepted Dr. Nagulendran's opinion as indisputably establishing
Stark's intent and mental state. The court explained that the mere absence
of countering expert testimony does not automatically establish the factual
assumptions underlying an expert's opinion or an expert's inferences from
assumed facts. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that inconsistencies in
Stark's own account of the crucial evening and the sworn testimony of a
deputy fire marshal contradicted Stark's claim of suicidal purpose. In an
account given to Dr. Nagulendran two days after the event, Stark stated
that he splashed gasoline on himself inside the house and started the fire.
However, in his deposition, Stark could not recall the events leading up
to the fire. In addition, in their motion for summary judgment, the Starks
asserted that Ray Stark had obtained gasoline, spread it about the house,
and ignited the fire. Furthermore, Fire Marshal Corolla, who investigated
the damage to the house shortly after the fire, testified that flammable
liquid was splashed freely about the basement of the home and that
separate fires had been set on a screen porch on the ground level of the
home. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that one could possibly conclude from
this evidence that Stark's express purpose was to damage his home rather
than to commit suicide by self-immolation.
The Fourth Circuit held that if the district court resolved the issue of
Ray Stark's purpose against the Starks, their argument must fail. However,
the court recognized that another legally valid argument existed. Theoret-
ically, Ray Stark's mental state could have negated Erie's noncoverage
provisions even if his intent was not solely to commit suicide. Nonetheless,
the Fourth Circuit found that because the Starks had argued throughout
that Ray Stark's only purpose was suicide, they could not prevail on this
theory.
Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit expressed that if the district court
determined that Stark possessed a suicidal purpose, the lower court must
still confront the second issue of whether the characteristics of Stark's
insanity would negate all of Erie's noncoverage provisions. The Fourth
Circuit first contemplated the language of the three clauses that Erie
asserted excluded liability and found they all required Stark to possess
some degree of volitional and cognitive capacity. The "increased hazard"
1993]
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clause provided that Erie would suspend coverage if any means within the
insured's control or knowledge substantially increased the hazard that
caused the property damage. The court concluded that an insured must
have the mental capacity to control a hazard or have knowledge of a
means by which a hazard is increased to enact this provision.
The Fourth Circuit then examined the "neglect" provision, which
excluded coverage for losses resulting from the failure of an insured to use
all reasonable means to protect covered property at the time of loss. The
court construed this clause as implying that the insured must possess the
capacity to recognize and choose between alternative courses of conduct
after identifying the risks each poses. Finally, the court examined the
"intentional act" provision, which excluded liability for damages arising
from any actions of the insured party undertaken with the intent to cause
such a loss. The Fourth Circuit found that this provision clearly required
the formation of a specific purpose-the actual intention to cause damage
to the insured home.
Having decided the mental capacity an insured party must possess to
enact each of Erie's noncoverage provisions, the court addressed the district
court's conclusion that any state of insanity would demonstrate the absence
of the mental capacity required by these provisions. The Fourth Circuit
specifically focused on whether a suicidal purpose would negate the "inten-
tional act" clause under the controlling law of Maryland. Of the three
noncoverage clauses, the court felt this provision was the most applicable
to the facts of the case. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the
district court's finding that Stark's suicidal purpose clearly voided the
"intentional act" provision because Stark's suicidal purpose implicitly dem-
onstrated a lack of volitional capacity.
Relying on prior Fourth Circuit precedent construing Maryland law," 0
the appellate court explained that, in Maryland, only two types of insanity
prevent an individual from entertaining intentionality. The first type of
insanity is a "delusional" insanity under which the person does not under-
stand the physical consequences of an act. The second type of insanity is
an "insane impulse" where the individual is unable to resist engaging in
the suicidal act or, in other words, lacks volitional capacity. Thus, the
applicability of an "intentional act" clause to a suicidal person hinges on
whether the injured's mental state at the time in question precluded the
ability to choose between committing suicide or not committing suicide.
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit determined that the district court erred in
finding any state of insanity would necessarily negate all of the noncoverage
provisions.
The Fourth Circuit concluded from this analysis that the Starks' argu-
ment would fail under the "intentional act" exclusion unless they established
440. See Reinking v. Philadelphia Am. Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that insurance company is liable for medical expenses resulting from treatment of
insured's self-inflicted injuries despite policy clause excluding coverage for intentionally self-
inflicted injuries).
